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JANUARY-FEBRUARY, 1958
ONE YEAR REVIEW OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
By VANCE R. DITTMAN, JR.
Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law
This review is intended to cover decisions of the Supreme Court of
Colorado from January 1, 1957, to January 1, 1958. Cases which apply
principles already well established are omitted, it being the purpose of
the reviewer to bring to the attention of the profession only those deci-
sions which are novel in principle or which represent departures from
accepted practices. The same arrangement will be followed as was used
in the review for 1956.'
RULE 4
In Jones v. Colescott,2 the matter of possible waiver of lack of juris-
diction over the person is presented in a novel fashion. Following default
judgments based upon admittedly invalid substituted service of process
a motion was made to set aside the defaults. The denial of the motion
by the trial court was held to be error, the supreme court pointing out
that although the motion by the defendants waived lack of jurisdiction
over them, such appearance on their part would not serve to validate
the void judgment and that the defendants should have been afforded
the opportunity to present their defenses. Thus, although their motion
was equivalent to a general appearance, it did not deprive defendants
of their right to present their defenses going to the merits.
RULE 8 (c)
Davis v. Bonebrake3 deals with the issues presented by an affirma-
tive defense. The order of the trial court permitting the plaintiff to
amend his complaint after presentation of his evidence was assigned as
error. The defendant had interposed an answer setting up the statute
of limitations as a defense and the amendment set up fraudulent con-
cealment of the facts to meet this defense. The supreme court reversed
the decision on other grounds but said, as to this point, that there was
no error since the amendment injected no new issue into the case, no
reply being required by the plaintiff, thus putting the defendants on
notice that any matter in avoidance of the statute would be deemed to
be in issue without a reply. The court pointed out that the amendment
could not be prejudicial to the defendants since the matter set forth in
avoidance was already before the court.
RULE 9 (C)
This rule relates to the pleading of performance or occurrence of
conditions precedent and to the denial thereof, placing on the part),
alleging the performance or occurrence the duty to establish such facts.
In Sullivan v. McCarthy,4 an action to recover guaranteed profits under
a contract of sale of a vending machine, the plaintiff alleged that he
had "complied with the provisions of the contract."5 This matter was
put in issue by defendant's answer and the issues were resolved in plain-
tiff's favor. As to another condition the'answer tendered no issue and
the plaintiff offered no evidence to show its performance. The court
said: "The plaintiff, while obligated to establish the performance of those
'Dittman, One Year Review of Civil Procedure, 34 DICTA 69 (1957).
2 307 P.2d 464 (Colo. 1957).
3313 P.2d 982 (Colo. 1957).
4 314 P.2d 901 (Colo. 1957).
5 Id. at 901.
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conditions within the framed issues, is under no obligation to prove
the performance of conditions other than those with reference to which
defendant has specifically alleged failure to perform .... ." Thus, since
the Rule requires a denial to "be made specifically and with particu-
larity," a failure to deny admits the well pleaded allegations of the
complaint.
RULE 14
The device of impleader presents many interesting questions, not
the least of which arose in Arms Roofing Co. v. Petrie.7 Here a holder
in due course of a promissory note brought an action against the maker.
The question concerned the propriety of a third party order secured by
the defendant to bring in as a third party defendant the original payee,
who had endorsed the note to the plaintiff. The third party complaint
alleged duress in the execution of the note and demanded judgment
against such payee for all sums which might be adjudged in favor of
the holder against the maker. The court pointed out that the third party
plaintiff's claim was independent of and apart from the plaintiff's claim
and that the result of the trial between the maker and the payee could
not affect the right of the holder to judgment against the maker or
against the payee-endorser. The court approved a rule stated by a federal
court that "the test to determine when a third party defendant may be
impleaded under Rule 14 is whether he could have been joined orig-
inally as a defendant by the plaintiff .. ."s under Rule 20.
RULE 25
In Film Enterprises, Inc. v. Selected Pictures, Inc.,9 one of the defend-
ants (lied pending suit and a timely motion to substitute his executrix
as a defendant was denied. At the trial the action was dismissed and a
new trial was denied. On a motion to dismiss plaintiff's writ of error
the motion was granted and the court pointed out that a substitution of
parties could not be ordered by the supreme court because Rule 25 per-
mits the trial court to order substitution in certain cases within two years
but requires a dismissal as to the deceased party if such substitution is
not made. Hence, at a time three years after the death of a party no
substitution could be made, the Rule being mandatory as to dismissal
and since it acts as a sort of statute of limitations the enlargement of
time thereunder is forbidden under Rule 6 (b).
RULE 60 (b)
It appears that the trial court does not err in refusing to set aside a
default judgment where the defendant alleges merely that he has a
meritorious defense. In Riss v. Air Rental, Inc.'0 the court refused to
disturb the order of the trial court under circumstances where the
defendant was unable to show any excusable neglect on his part, even
though there might have been a meritorious defense alleged.
RULE 69 (a)
In an original proceeding in the Supreme Court for a rule requir-
ing respondents to show cause why the sheriff should not be permitted
to proceed with a sale on execution of certain corporate stock, a deben-
ture bond and a promissory note, the respondents argued that Rule
6 Id. at 902.
7 314 P.2d 903 (Colo. 1957).
s Id. at 906. relying on United States v. Jollimore, 2 F.R.D. 148 (D. Mass. 1941).
9 306 P.2d 252 (Colo. 1957).
10 315 P.2d 820 (Colo. 1957).
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69 (a) authorizes the trial court to prevent sale on execution. This pro-
ceeding had been commenced after the district court had denied an
order directing the sheriff to levy upon and sell such items. 1 The court
held that the sale should proceed, pointing out that although the perti-
nent statute 2 was not cited by counsel, it was, nevertheless, controlling,
and this property not being within the class of assets exempt from exe-
cution under the statute, fell within the general provision providing for
the sale of goods and chattels. The court also took occasion to say that
the statute created a substantive right in a judgment creditor to enforce
collection of his judgment against non-exempt property and that a rule
of procedure cannot be so construed as to curtail substantive rights
created by the legislature. This decision clarifies the question as to
the right to reach choses in action on execution, a question heretofore
shrouded in doubt.
RULE 106
In Stull v. District Court3 there was involved an application in
the nature of prohibition, in which it appeared that the district court
had exceeded its jurisdiction by granting an injunction under circum-
stances where the requirements of Rule 65 were not complied with.
In holding that the proceeding was proper the court, through Mr. Justice
Sutton, said: "There is no plain, speedy or adequate remedy available
to petitioners except that herein sought. . . . [W] e consider it a matter
of 'great public importance' when an inferior court has issued injunc-
tive orders without complying with the provisions of Rule 65."' 1
RULE 112 (f)
Once again the question of the sufficiency of the record on writ of
error has been before the court, this time in the case of Rechnitz v. Rech-
nitZ.'5 Here the transcript was presented to the trial judge at a time
more than three months after the final order of the court. The judge
refused to sign and certify it but plaintiff in error nevertheless filed the
transcript in the Supreme Court. The court granted a motion to strike
the transcript from the files and to dismiss the writ of error, stating that,
without the transcript there was nothing to review, particularly since
the order made by the trial court was discretionary and without a tran-
script there was no way to show that the court had abused its discretion
or had acted arbitrarily or capriciously.
11 See Jones v. District Court, 312 P.2d 503 (Colo. 1957).
12 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 77-1-2 (1953).
1, 308 P.2d 1006 (Colo. 1957).
14 Id. at 1010.
15 309 P.2d 200 (Colo. 1957).
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